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Abstract 
Double energy vulnerability (DEV) is the increased likelihood of negative impacts upon well-being, 
owing to the intersection of domestic energy poverty (DEP) and transport energy poverty (TEP). Whilst 
considerable research has focused on the geography of DEP, similar issues of transport-related energy 
costs have received less attention, reflecting entrenched disciplinary and sectoral boundaries. This is 
despite transport accounting for a high proportion of household energy consumption and expenditure 
amongst specific vulnerable populations and locales. Meanwhile, owing to the prevalence of fossil fuels 
in domestic and transport energy, both are affected by changes in fuel prices. Subsequently, selected 
households face high expenditure on both domestic and transport energy. Focusing on a case study of 
England, this paper analyses the geographical distribution of DEP and TEP, and the extent to which the 
two overlap. Two neighbourhood-scale analyses shed light on the geographies of DEV, using three 
existing DEP and TEP indicators. Firstly, we identify significant clusters of neighbourhoods with a high 
or low propensity to DEV using a Local Moran’s I statistic. Secondly, we identify neighbourhoods in the 
highest and lowest quantiles for multiple DEP and TEP indicators. Our results illustrate that as many as 
6% of neighbourhoods (accounting for 3 million residents) have a high propensity towards DEV 
(depending on the indicators selected) typically concentrating in isolated, rural neighbourhoods. We 
discuss our findings in light of the role that lack of access to networked energy and transport 
infrastructures plays in aggravating energy poverty in both domains. The findings support a cross-
sectoral policy approach to tackle the issue of DEV.   
 
  




1. Introduction  
Energy poverty (also known as fuel poverty in the UK context) is an established area of study [1, 2, 3, 4, 
5, 6]. Yet it has overwhelmingly focused on domestic energy consumption, i.e. within the home. This is 
emphasised by definitions of energy poverty that define the condition as ‘the inability to attain a socially 
and materially necessitated level of domestic energy services’ ([7] pg. 31, emphasis added by authors). 
Similar issues of energy costs and affordability in transport have received less attention. Moreover, the 
little research that exists is relatively disconnected from energy poverty debates, perhaps reflecting 
entrenched disciplinary and sectoral boundaries [8], although this is gradually changing [9].  
There are however several reasons for transport to be included in energy poverty debates. Firstly, 
transport accounts for a large share of household energy consumption and related expenditure and 
climate emissions [10, 11], representing on average 13% of EU household expenditure in 2017 [12,13]. 
Secondly, households make trade-offs between different expenditures, for example whether to heat or 
to eat [14], suggesting that they may also make trade-offs between domestic and transport energy 
expenditure. Thirdly, and relatedly, environmental measures such as carbon pricing would affect 
expenditure in both domains, and their distributional impacts need to be assessed [15], as they can be 
politically controversial. More broadly, both domestic energy poverty (DEP) and transport energy 
poverty (TEP) have negative impacts in terms of wellbeing, hardship and social exclusion [1,16, 17, 8].   
An open question in this context concerns the spatial patterns of DEP and TEP, and the extent to which 
the two intersect. In England, recent empirical research has investigated the spatial patterns of DEP, 
using different government indicators [18, 19] and wider indicators of energy vulnerability [20, 21]. 
Similarly, Mattioli et al. [22] have proposed a composite spatial indicator of vulnerability to motor fuel 
price increases, which is conceptually close to the notion of ‘transport energy poverty’ [23, 24]. Like 
many forms of disadvantage, DEV is likely to be socially and spatially concentrated. This raises the 
question of to what extent these problems overlap geographically – in other words, do ‘energy poor’ 
areas concerning DEP tend to be affected by TEP as well?  
Focusing upon a case study of England, this paper explores the problem of double energy vulnerability 
(DEV). DEV refers to the likelihood of experiencing negative impacts upon wellbeing owing to the 
intersection of both DEP and TEP. In doing so, we make four key contributions.  Firstly, our analysis 
provides the first estimates of the scale of DEV in England, with between 1.6 - 5.9% of neighbourhoods 
(and a roughly equivalent share of population) estimated to experience spatially concentrated DEV, 
depending on the indicators selected. Secondly, we pay particular attention to the spatialities of DEV, 
evidencing how the problem typically concentrates in isolated, rural areas. Thirdly, the paper 
represents, to the best of our knowledge, the first effort to conceptualise and analyse DEV in the 
English-speaking literature. Finally, our analysis contributes to a wider need to understand the ways in 
which different forms of poverty and disadvantage bundle together, intensifying the negative impacts 
associated. Although focused upon a single case study, our methods and findings are applicable to other 
countries across the Global North, particularly those in which fossil fuels make up a considerable 
proportion of the energy sources used for heating.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the background, defining key terms of DEP, TEP 
and DEV (Section 2.1.). It also reviews the spatial perspectives in existing research for each (Section 2.2-
2.4). Section 3 introduces our case study. Having ascertained that DEV and its geographical distribution, 
warrant further exploration, Section 4 outlines the appropriate analysis scale, indicator datasets, and 
methodology. This is followed by results of the analysis, specifically interpreting the spatial distribution 




of DEP and TEP (Section 5) and subsequently DEV through their spatial intersection (Section 6) and the 
joint distribution of multiple indicators (Section 7). Our discussion in Section 8 summarises our findings, 
reflection on policy implications, limitations and future research directions.  
  





2.1. Spatial perspectives on DEP  
In recent years a burgeoning research agenda has emerged concerning energy geographies [25]. This 
agenda recognises how space and place reconfigure, shape and form energy systems in defining ways. 
Central to the drive to understand the spatialities of the relationship between energy and society is a 
recognition that both the beneficial and detrimental consequences of harnessing energy are not evenly 
distributed. This includes the disparities in being without sufficient domestic energy, indicative of how 
a choice between, or access to, specific technologies, energy carriers and infrastructures reflects 
existing power structures in society [6].  
In relation to energy consumption, there has been a continued focus upon the domestic sphere, 
specifically understanding and measuring the spatialities of vulnerability to DEP. For a comprehensive 
and critical review of the measurement of DEP using composite indicators developed to date in the 
European context see Thomson et al. [26]. Thomson et al. recognise the challenges of measuring energy 
poverty as “it is a culturally sensitive and private condition, which is temporally and spatially dynamic” 
([26] p. 879). New framings of the drivers of energy poverty have drawn attention to this spatial 
dynamism to differing degrees, calling into question how DEP can be meaningfully measured and 
mapped using indicators that place the spatialities of the condition at their core. Fahmy et al. [27] 
recognises that the spatial distribution of DEP varies considerably depending upon the chosen 
measurement approach, resulting in the over and under-estimation of energy poverty, or mis-targeting 
of alleviation measures. 
In response, a growing body of literature has succeeded in capturing the spatialities of DEP to varying 
degrees, at different scales and using a variety of framings and indicators. Examples range from cross-
country or regional comparisons of DEP propensity [5], national indicators of DEP disaggregated to small 
areas [28], area-based targeting to supplement national indicators [29, 30], bottom-up indicators that 
explore a wider range of spatial inequalities [31, 32], and spatially-orientated indicators that account 
for the spatial variability in the importance of DEP drivers [21]. However, Hall et al. [33] note that DEP 
“is just one of many ways in which power relations, fairness and disadvantage are created and 
expressed within energy systems” (p. 413). By comparison, there has been little recognition of the role 
played by transport when considering questions of disadvantage and justice in relation to energy 
systems. 
2.2. Spatial perspectives on TEP 
Within transport studies, there is a relatively long tradition of studies on ‘transport poverty’ – also 
sometimes referred to as ‘transport disadvantage’ or ‘transport-related social exclusion’ [34, 35, 36, 
17], 37]. Lucas et al. [17] define transport poverty as a broad research field encompassing ‘transport 
affordability’ (i.e. the inability to meets transport costs), ‘mobility poverty’ (i.e. limited access to 
transport modes), ‘accessibility poverty’ (i.e. difficulty of reaching key services and opportunities) and 
‘exposure to transport externalities’ (e.g. road traffic casualties and air pollution).  
Given the inherently spatial nature of travel behaviour and transport provision, researchers have paid 
much attention to spatial patterns of transport poverty. Hine and Grieco [35] suggest that transport 
disadvantage takes the form of ‘scatters’ and ‘clusters’ in space, as it is influenced both by spatial factors 
(e.g. access to public transport networks) and individual and household characteristics (e.g. income and 
disability). Reviewing different forms of (car-related) transport disadvantage, Mattioli and Colleoni [38]  




observe that their intensity is typically higher in lower-density peri-urban and rural areas. Lucas et al. 
[39] study of Liverpool, for example, finds that the location of where people live within the city is more 
influential on transport poverty than social determinants.  
While transport poverty research has traditionally emphasised the multi-faceted, multi-scalar nature of 
the problem, not all its different facets have an energy aspect [8]. In other words, ‘transport energy 
poverty’ (TEP) is best seen as a subset of a broader transport poverty problem [23, 24]. Perhaps for this 
reason, it is only recently that researchers have proposed quantitative indicators of TEP, often adapting 
established indicators of DEP including the 10% and Low Income High Cost (LIHC) indicators [40, 41,  
42, 43, 44,  45] (for further details on the specifics of these indicators see Section 4.2). These are mostly 
based on survey and/or modelled data at the individual or household level, providing limited 
information on spatial patterns of TEP. Still most of these studies find higher levels of TEP in peri-urban 
and rural areas, as compared to city cores – although this pattern can be confounded when income 
poverty is concentrated in inner cities, as in the UK [42].    
The emerging research on TEP is not well integrated with the more established body of studies on DEP. 
Despite early attempts to investigate transport from an energy poverty perspective [46], the focus of 
‘energy poverty’ research has remained overwhelmingly on the domestic domain (as discussed in 
Section 2.2). The exception here is France, where DEP and TEP are considered as two dimensions of the 
same, overarching problem, and an official indicator exists for both [28; 47;48; 49]. In this context, 
several French researchers have focused on the intersections and interactions between the two 
dimensions (Section 2.3). More recently, OpenExp [24] has proposed an indicator framework for energy 
poverty assessment of EU member states, including both a DEP and a TEP index. The results 
demonstrate that the two dimensions have different incidence patterns – with countries such as 
Finland performing considerably worse regarding TEP than they do on DEP, while others, including 
Hungary, accumulate both problems.   
Also of relevance in this context is research on ‘oil vulnerability’, i.e. social vulnerability to fuel price 
increases [50, 51; 52]. Here, empirical studies have focused on identifying areas that would suffer the 
most from fuel price hikes, using composite indicators that consider car ownership and use, economic 
resources, and availability of modal alternatives to the car. The findings of this research suggest that 
vulnerability to fuel price increases is typically higher in peri-urban and rural areas, although urban 
socio-spatial configurations (i.e. the distribution of different income groups within city-regions) and 
interregional differences in affluence play a confounding role. The indicator of TEP that we adopt in this 
paper is grounded in this research tradition.  
2.3. Intersections and interactions between DEP and TEP 
To date, little research has focused on the intersection between DEP and TEP, and much of it originates 
in France. In this context, the term ‘double energy vulnerability’ [53, 54, 55, 56], has been used to 
identify households or areas that are affected by both problems at the same time.  
According to government indicators, 15% of French households are in DEP and 10% in TEP, with 22% 
being affected by at least one problem, and 3% by both [28]. Yet, the sociodemographic profiles of the 
two groups are different [57]. TEP households are typically active in the labour market, have low-to-
middle incomes, and live in peri-urban areas. DEP households, on the other hand, tend to be poorer, 
inactive, and are overrepresented in both rural areas and city centres. Subsequently, households in DEV 
are overrepresented in peri-urban and rural areas, and amongst farmers [28]. Further empirical studies 




based on household survey data have confirmed these findings, while providing further insights. Verry 
et al. [56] concludes that the risk of DEV is particularly high for young adults, single parent households, 
and those living in older buildings. Mayer et al.’s [43] study of Strasbourg finds higher ‘double energy 
burdens’ among households with children, in social housing and in neighbourhoods close, but slightly 
removed from the city centre. Berry et al. [40], based on multidimensional indicators (i.e. including non-
monetary factors), estimates the incidence of energy poverty to be slightly higher in transport (21% of 
households) than housing (18%), with 31% affected in at least one sector, and 7% doubly vulnerable. 
These findings also suggest that, while both DEP households and TEP households are overrepresented 
in sparsely populated areas, they tend to have different socio-demographic profiles.  
Overall, the research suggests that DEP and TEP tend to affect different subsets of the population, 
although there is some overlap between the two. However, evidence from other studies implies a 
greater overlap: Mattioli [8, 42] identifies that in Germany, France and the UK between 66% and 79% 
of ‘forced car owners’ – i.e. households who own and use cars despite being in absolute poverty – are 
also affected by DEP.  
The trade-offs that households make when faced with high expenditure on both transport and domestic 
energy have also been explored. The broad conclusion is that households find it easier to curtail 
domestic energy consumption, as motor fuel consumption is often essential for commuting, and thus 
employment and income generation [47, 48, 8]. Additionally, peri-urban households find it easier to 
change their heating behaviour, or improve energy efficiency at home, rather than switching to other 
modes or relocating to less car-dependent areas in order to reduce transport expenditure [58, 55,59]. 
Mattioli et al. [42] evidence how TEP households have less capacity to reduce motor fuel expenditure 
in response to price increases, suggesting that they might cut expenditure on other essential items, 
including domestic energy. Overall, these findings suggest that, in some cases, restriction behaviour in 
domestic energy consumption may in fact be caused by high expenditure on transport energy. This 
highlights the importance of investigating overlaps between the two forms of energy poverty.  
Finally, other studies – again, mostly from France – have used spatial data to investigate in more detail 
the geography of DEV. The French statistical agency’s spatial modelling suggests that rural (and to some 
extent peri-urban) municipalities are the most likely to accumulate both forms of energy poverty [28]. 
Several studies undertaken by local authorities have confirmed this finding at the regional and local 
level [53, 54, 55]. The analysis in this paper builds on these approaches, using spatial data to investigate 
the overlap of DEP and TEP in England. Given the exploratory nature of the study, we do not put forward 
a formal hypothesis on the spatial patterns of DEV in England, although existing research from France 
would lead us to expect a concentration in rural and peri-urban areas.  
  




3. Case Study 
Our analysis focuses on England, a devolved nation in the UK. Mapping of Rural Urban Classification 
(RUC) data for small areas in Figure 1 demonstrates how London is, by far, the largest urban area, 
evident in the south eastern core radiation from the capital city. Administrative areas in England tend 
not to correspond with the limits of urban development, and many towns and cities have grown to form 
multifaceted urban agglomerations. This is the case for the remaining five major conurbations: the West 
Midlands (central), Greater Manchester (North West), West Yorkshire (North East) and Tyneside (North 
East), Liverpool (North West).  
Different geographies of DEP and TEP have been identified in the context of England (Figure 2 and 
Figure 3). The former 10% indicator used by government until 2012 (Section 4.3.2) tends to pinpoint 
DEP in relatively rural areas [18], particularly affecting amongst pensioner and off-the-grid households 
[19]. Meanwhile, the newer LIHC indicator identifies a relatively urban and spatially heterogeneous 
range of neighbourhoods, highlighting greater concentrations of DEP amongst low-income families. The 
indicator proposed by Mattioli et al. [22] shows high levels of TEP in most rural and peri-urban areas in 
England, as well as higher vulnerability in northern city regions compared to London and the South East 
(due to higher incomes and better public transport provision in and around the capital).  
Figure 1. RUC for Lower Super Output Areas (LSOA) across England 
Data source: [60, 61] 












Figure 2. Spatial distribution of ten percent and LIHC indicators across England 
Data source: [62, 61]. Map scales are in deciles.  
 
  




Figure 3. Spatial distribution of the TEP indicator across England 
Data source: [22, 61] Map scale is in deciles. 
 
 









4. Approach, data and methods  
4.1. Defining key terms  
This paper aims to explore spatial patterns of DEV, which we define as the likelihood of experiencing 
negative impacts for well-being owing to the intersection of domestic and transport-related energy 
poverty. Regarding DEP, we adopt Bouzarovski and Petrova’s definition as ‘the inability to attain a 
socially and materially necessitated level of domestic energy services’ ([7] p.31). As discussed in Section 
2.2, transport poverty is a broad phenomenon with multiple manifestations (Lucas et al., 2016), some 
of which have little to do with energy consumption. In this paper, we use the term TEP to refer to the 
subset of transport poverty issues related to the access and affordability of transport energy services. 
Previous research suggests that, in practice, in the Global North these are mostly related to the access 
and use of motorised transport modes, especially cars [8]. 
4.2. Indicator datasets 
Both DEP and TEP are broad and multidimensional concepts which are impossible to capture using a 
single indicator. Accordingly, the notion of DEV describes first and foremost a broad research direction, 
which can (and should) be explored using a variety of methods and empirical indicators. Here, we 
necessarily use those indicators that enable a fine-grained spatial analysis. For DEP, these are the 10% 
and LIHC indicators adopted by the English government. For TEP, we use the indicator of vulnerability 
to fuel price increases proposed by Mattioli et al. [22], building on the tradition of oil vulnerability 
studies (Section 2.2). While we acknowledge that none of these indicators perfectly represent the broad 
phenomena they refer to, we argue that they are well-suited to an initial, explorative study into the 
under researched problem of DEV. We expect that further research will expand the range of DEV 
indicators beyond the relatively simple indicators utilised here, bringing further insights into the 
spatiality of the problem.  In addition, the three indicators are broken down using a RUC dataset [60]. 
4.3.1. Scale of analysis 
Lower Super Output Areas (LSOA) are commonly used for the reporting of small area statistics in 
England and Wales. In England, there are 32,844 LSOAs that represent between 1000-3000 individuals, 
or 400-1200 households (ONS, 2011a.). However, a small selection of LSOA are missing from the TEP 
indicator and therefore the analysis (n=1,172, i.e. 3.6%). Missing LSOA are likely to have low levels of 
TEP ([22], p.104), and thus their exclusion should not overly affect our findings on DEV. In using LSOA 
we recognise that aggregated datasets can conceal variation within the population in each unit. 
However, the LSOA scale is the highest resolution at which all datasets are available. 
4.3.2. DEP indicators 
Sub-regional estimates of DEP are produced by the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy (BEIS), formerly the Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC). Over the last decade, 
consultation on a new DEP strategy for England led to the replacement of the former 10% indicator, 
that recognised those households who spent over 10% of their income on energy as energy poor, with 
a new LIHC indicator, that recognises those households with higher than average fuel costs and lower 
than average incomes as energy poor [63].  
This shift has been the focus of substantial critical analysis [64, 65, 4] acknowledging the limitations of 
both indicators. For example, the 10% indicator has been critiqued for being too sensitive to the rising 
costs of fuels [63], whilst the LIHC indicator is a relative measure that, on its introduction, reduced the 
number of fuel poor households without additional policy measures or spending [65]. Both DEP 




indicators acknowledge different aspects of what is means to be energy poor (Section 3). In practice, 
the LIHC indicator is now used by the government to fulfil its statutory targets, whilst the 10% indicator 
is commonly referred to by practitioners as the more comprehensible of the two. Subsequently, we 
analyse both the 10% and LIHC DEP indicators. For 2012, the year in which the LIHC indicator was 
introduced, estimates at the LSOA scale are available for both the 10% and LIHC indicators [62] (Figure 
2).  
4.3.3. TEP indicator 
Unlike DEP, there is no official government indicator of TEP for England, either at the individual or 
spatial level. Therefore, we adopt the composite indicator developed by Mattioli et al. [22] to assess 
patterns of vulnerability to motor fuel price increases at the LSOA scale (Figure 3).  
The indicator builds on the tradition of ‘oil vulnerability’ studies reviewed in Section 2.3, and on a 
tripartite understanding of ‘social vulnerability’ as the product of exposure, sensitivity and adaptive 
capacity (Table 1) [66, 67, 50, 52]. The indicator is based on a combination of car use and expenditure 
data derived from vehicle inspection test records [68, 69, 70, 71], modelled household income data 
[72] and estimates of travel time to key services by transport modes alternative to the car (‘Accessibility 
Statistics’) provided by the UK Department for Transport (DfT) [73].  
In simple terms, the composite indicator identifies TEP areas as those with a combination of: i) high 
household expenditure on motor fuel relative to income (i.e. high exposure); ii) low income (i.e. high 
sensitivity); and iii) high car dependence due to a being unable to access essential services via 
alternative transport modes (i.e. lack of adaptive capacity). TEP areas would be the most vulnerable to 
increases in the price of fuel. Vice-versa, the indicator considers areas with high income, low car 
dependence and low expenditure on motor fuel (relative to income) as having low levels of TEP. The 
composite indicator is based on the aggregation of the three (standardized) component variables, in 
additive format with equal weighting. For a more thorough discussion of the indicator’s construction 
see Mattioli et al. [22].  
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4.3.4. RUC Dataset 
The RUC dataset produced by the Department for Environment and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) differentiates 
LSOA into 10 typologies, six rural categories and four urban categories (Figure 1). Those areas classified 
as urban are part of a physical settlement with 10,000 people or more [75]. 
4.3. Local Moran’s I 
A Local Moran’s I cluster and outlier analysis is used to identify local patterns of association within and 
between the three indicator datasets. Local Moran’s I reflects the tendency for nearby locations to 
cluster geographically, a process often referred to as spatial autocorrelation [76]. Using a Local Moran’s 
I statistic, clusters of LSOA with particularly high values (hot-spots) or low values (cold-spots) for each 
indicator are identified [76]. The analysis also highlights outliers, areas in which a low value is 
surrounded by a high value, or vice versa (Table 2.). Population Weighted Centroids that provide an 
illustration of the population distribution within a small area were used to compute the Local Moran’s 




I statistic. Clusters and outliers identified are significant for a 95% confidence level. The spatial 
relationship for the Local Moran's I analysis is adaptive and conceptualised using a spatial weights 
matrix with a distance feature of k nearest neighbours, setting the number of neighbours to 8 [77]. 
Although, in practice the number of nearest neighbours had little bearing on the spatial patterns yielded 
during the analysis.  
  




Table 2. Description of Local Moran’s I clusters and outliers 
 
4.5. Intersection analysis  
In addition to the analysis of each indicator in isolation, we investigate the spatial intersection of the 
TEP indicator with each of the DEP indicators (the LIHC and 10%) to identify DEV. To ensure that our 
findings are robust, we adopt two alternative methods of exploring the intersection:  
1. Building on the Local Moran’s I analysis, we identify LSOA that are identified as HH clusters or HL 
outliers according to the TEP and either of the two DEP indicators (Section 6) 
2. We also identify LSOA that are in the top decile of the distribution of at least two of three indicators; 
repeating the analysis considering the top quartile, higher-than-median values, and the bottom 
decile (Section 7).  
The latter analysis is necessary due to the high statistical significance threshold for the Local Moran’s I 
meaning that the first analysis could overlook marginal neighbourhoods without a statistically 
significant value for both indicators, but where the accumulation of both factors makes them 
vulnerable. Additionally, consideration of all three indicators in the latter analysis allowed us to focus 
in on areas in which DEV is likely to be problematic, irrespective of the chosen DEP indicator. Areas that 
score high on all three metrics should be considered as extremely vulnerable, as the two DEP indicators 
capture distinct and complementary aspects of energy vulnerability [18].  
 
5. The spatial distribution of DEP and TEP 
We first turn our attention to the spatial distribution of each DEP and TEP indicator individually (Section 
5.1-5.3), and then examine the correlation between them (5.4).  
5.1. 10% DEP indicator  
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HH clusters (n=6281) of DEP using the 10% indicator are geographically concentrated in remote rural 
areas and large, post-industrial conurbations in all regions outside London and the South East (Figure 
4, Table 3). London and the South East have comparatively few statistically significant HH Clusters using 
the 10% indicator, with London containing only LL clusters according to the indicator. This spatial 
distribution reflects the findings from analyses of the 10% indicator carried out by Moore [64] and 
Liddell et al. [4] that emphasise the role of energy price in determining the distribution of energy 
poverty according to the 10% indicator, partially explaining the concentration of DEP in rural areas that 
are without access to the comparatively cheaper gas network. As such, these households typically rely 
on oil for heating, which is relatively expensive. The spatial distribution also reflects the well-
documented regional division between a relatively depressed north characterised by socio-economic 
inequality and an affluent south [78], a divide that is increasingly fragmented and contested [79]. 
  




Figure 4. Cluster and outlier analysis of 10% DEP indicator 
Data source: [62, 61]  
 




5.2. LIHC DEP indicator 
HH clusters (n=4588) of DEP using the LIHC indicator are more spatially heterogeneous compared to 
the other indicators analysed [18] (Figure 5). Robinson et al. [18] attributes this spatial heterogeneity 
in part to the relative nature of the LIHC indicator. Due in part to its consideration of income after 
housing costs (unlike the 10% indicator), HH clusters according to the LIHC indicator are concentrated 
in a diverse range of remote rural areas and inner-city areas. The LIHC indicator is the only indicator, of 
the three studied, to have a sizeable number of HH Clusters in the Greater London region.  
  




Figure 5. Cluster and outlier analysis of LIHC DEP indicator 
Data source: [62, 61] 
 




5.3. TEP indicator 
The cluster and outlier analysis of the TEP indicator reveal a stark spatial distribution, with HH clusters 
(n=5227) concentrating in geographically rural areas across England, and peri-urban areas to the north 
(Figure 6). LL clusters (n=6076) are spatially concentrated in large swathes of London and its economic 
hinterland, with resilience in the region attributable to relatively high incomes coupled with low car 
dependence and low expenditure on motor fuel [22]. There are similar, but much smaller 
concentrations of LL clusters in the core of other city-regions.   
  




Figure 6. Cluster and outlier analysis of TEP indicator 
Data source: [22, 61]
 
  

















HH 4588 14.49 6281 19.83 5227 16.51 
HL 571 1.80 466 1.47 310 0.98 
LH 794 25.07 590 1.86 205 0.65 
LL 6689 21.12 9205 29.07 6076 19.19 
Not signif.  19030 52.01 15130 47.77 19854 62.67 
 
5.4. Correlation between DEP and TEP indicators  
Fig.7 shows that, while there is a relatively strong correlation between the two DEP indicators (panel 
c), the association of the TEP indicator with the 10% DEP indicator is only moderate (panel a), and there 
is virtually no correlation between the TEP indicator and the LIHC DEP indicator (panel b). This confirms 
what can be observed when comparing the maps reported in Fig.2 and 3: the 10% DEP indicator has 
higher values in relatively rural areas, where TEP also tends to be an issue, whereas the LIHC DEP 
indicator identifies a more spatially heterogeneous range of neighbourhoods, including both urban and 
rural areas.  
 
Figure 7. Joint distribution of DEP and TEP indicators: scatterplots and Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient values 
 









6. Double energy vulnerability 
Having explored the spatial distribution of each indicator in turn, we now analyse DEV, specifically the 
spatial intersections of the TEP and DEP indicators, based on the results of the Local Moran’s I analysis.  
6.1. Spatial intersection of the 10% and TEP indicators using high clusters and outliers 
The 10% DEP indicator and the TEP indicator spatially intersect in 5.9% of LSOA analysed (n=1854). 
These areas represent 2,965,837 persons (5.3% of persons) or 1,266,522 households (4.6% of 
households). These LSOA account for a small percentage of the total number of LSOA, yet they occupy 
a disproportionate amount of space when the results are mapped (Figure 8.). This is because most of 
these areas are rural and the LSOA are typically larger due to a lower population density (Figure 9). 
There is little evidence of DEV in either London or the South East, with spatial intersection of HH clusters 
and HL outliers concentrating in remote, rural areas including Cornwall and Devon, the Welsh Borders, 
Cumbria, Northumberland, County Durham and Norfolk.  
This spatial trend is emphasised when the data is disaggregated using the RUC classification. The RUC 
demonstrates how those areas identified as DEV using the 10% indicator tend to be rural (72% of LSOA). 
Approximately 30% of LSOA are classified as Rural Village and Dispersed and Rural Town and Fringe 
respectively (Figure 9). Figure 10 considers the relative share for each RUC classification that DEV LSOA 
represent, compared to the total number of LSOA in England. For Rural Village and Dispersed in a Sparse 
Setting, because of the relatively small number of LSOA in this classification (n=181), a majority of LSOA 
(85%) are recognised as DEV. 
  













Figure 9. RUC of DEV for both indicators 
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6.2. Spatial intersection of LIHC and TEP indicators using high clusters and outliers 
The LIHC DEP indicator and the TEP indicator spatially intersect in 1.6% of LSOA in England (n=501) 
identifying a lower incidence of DEV compared to the 10% indicator (Figure 7), which reflects the lack 
of correlation between the two indicators (Section 5.4). These neighbourhoods represent 786,991 
persons (1.4% of persons) or 322,601 households (1.2% of households).  Those LSOA that are identified 
as DEV are distributed across all regions in England in a relatively fragmented way, apart from some 
concentration at the English-Welsh borders and around the Pennines mountain range in the north. In 
the London region, there is little evidence of DEV.  
This spatial distribution can be attributed to the relatively urban nature of DEP when measured using 
the LIHC indicator [18]. Similar to DEV using the 10% indicator, a greater proportion of DEV LSOA are 
either classified as either Rural Village and Dispersed in Sparse Setting (22%) or Rural Town and Fringe 
in Sparse Setting (18%). However, this rural concentration is less pronounced using the LIHC indicator, 
with a handful of urban areas also highlighted.  
 
7. Spatial analysis of the joint distribution of multiple indicators  
In this section, we explore the spatial intersection between TEP and DEP using an alternative approach 
– i.e. examining the joint distribution of all three indicators simultaneously and applying different 
thresholds to identify areas with high or low levels of vulnerability (Table 4).  
Our analysis identifies that approximately 7% of areas are in the top decile (the 10% of LSOA with the 
highest values) for two or three indicators, yet once again these occupy a disproportionate amount of 
space when the results are mapped (Figure 11). The top decile of indicators concentrates geographically 
in rural areas on the English-Welsh border, in the North West and in East Anglia. Only 0.6% of LSOA are 
in the top decile for all three indicators – suggesting that extreme forms of DEV are relatively rare. 
 
  




Table 4. LSOA in different quantiles for one, two and three indicators 
Indicator (number) Frequency (LSOA) Percentage (LSOA) Cumulative  
Upper decile (top 10%)    
0 24,673 77.90 77.90 
1 4,785 15.11 93.01 
2 2,035 6.43 99.43 
3 179 0.57 100.00 
Upper quartile (top 25%)    
0 15,851 50.05 50.05 
1 9,294 29.34 79.39 
2 5,299 16.73 96.12 
3 1,228 3.88 100.00 
Upper two quartiles (top 50%)    
0 6,557 20.73 20.73 
1 9,454 29.85 50.58 
2 9,124 28.81 79.39 
3 6,527 20.61 100.00 
Lower deciles (bottom 50%)    
0 6,557       20.73 
1 9,454       29.85 
2 9,124       28.81 
3 6,527       20.61 
Total 31,672 100.00 - 
 
  




Figure 11. LSOA in upper and lower decile (10%) for one, two and three indicators 
Data source: [62, 60, 22] 
 
 
If we consider areas in the top quartile (the 25% of LSOA with highest values) for two or three indicators 
(Figure 12), this applies to approximately 20% of LSOAs, but these cover most rural LSOA outside of the 
South East, and peri-urban parts of the urban corridor in the North. Only 3.9% of areas is in the top 
quartile for all three indicators. Meanwhile, almost 50% of areas have higher-than-median values for at 
least two of the indicators, giving an indication of the pervasiveness of energy poverty, if both transport 
and domestic energy are considered (Figure 13). The only region with lower-than-median values on 
most indicators is London and parts of the South East of England.  
Conversely, considering areas with very low values on most energy poverty indicators, we find that only 
8% of LSOA are in the bottom 10% of the distribution for two or three indicators. These LSOA are mainly 
clustered in and around Greater London (Figure 11). 
  




Figure 12. LSOA in upper quartile (top 25%) for one, two and three indicators 
Data source: [62, 60, 22] 
 
  




Figure 13. LSOA with higher-than-median values for one, two and three indicators 
Data source: [62, 60, 22] 
 




8. Discussion    
8.1. The geography of DEV in England  
Our analysis uncovers new geographies of household energy vulnerabilities that would not have come 
to light without simultaneously considering domestic and transport-related energy. Our analysis finds 
that some overlap exists between neighbourhoods susceptible to DEP and TEP in our case study of 
England. However, this varies depending on the indicators and methods used. Using the 10% DEP 
indicator and the TEP indicator, high clusters and outliers spatially intersect in 5.9% of LSOA analysed 
(1,266,522 households), Using the LIHC DEP indicator and the TEP indicator spatially intersect in 1.6% 
of LSOA in England identifying a lower incidence of DEV compared to the 10% indicator (322,601 
households). Meanwhile almost 50% of neighbourhoods have higher-than-median values for at least 
two of the three indicators, giving an indication of the pervasiveness of energy poverty, when both TEP 
and multiple dimensions of DEP are considered (Figure 13, Table 4).  
In England, DEV is spatially concentrated in remote rural areas. This can be explained, at least in part, 
by a lack of access to networks (in relation to both domestic energy and transport), governed by the 
differing wider systems of infrastructural provision and institutional arrangements within which urban 
and rural areas are embedded. Networked infrastructure that provides energy to the home has a 
complex spatiality [80]. In England, the economic liberalisation of infrastructure and markets in the 
energy sector over several decades and abandonment of universal tariff structures due to the 
privatisation of energy companies has led to fragmentation, with fewer cross subsidies between urban 
and rural areas [81]. In rural areas that are relatively expensive to supply, cross-subsidies from more 
lucrative urban areas have been dismantled. Subsequently households without access to the gas 
network are disproportionately reliant upon high-cost fuel for heating, including carbon-intensive oil 
[82]. Approximately 4% of primarily rural households in England had oil central heating in 2014, a figure 
that had doubled since 1996 [83].  
In the transport sector, the spatial patterning of networks is even more pronounced. Rural areas in the 
UK have poor provision of public transport [84, 37], and this can be the case even in the periphery of 
large cities [85]. This results in reliance on expensive, fossil-fuel based private vehicles for daily mobility, 
as shown by official accessibility metrics [22]. Since the 1980s, rural car dependence has been made 
worse by the deregulation and privatisation of local bus services outside of London, which makes the 
cross-subsidisation of rural services more difficult [86], as well as by more recent cuts to publicly 
subsidized services, which have hit rural areas the hardest [87].  
Overall, our finding that DEV is highly concentrated in rural areas is consistent with the results of French 
studies (Section 2.3), suggesting that the cumulation of DEP and TEP could be mostly a rural 
phenomenon in Europe. Golubchikov and O’Sullivan [88] put forward the concept of ‘energy periphery’ 
to identify how some places are “systematically disadvantaged through the entire energy system … due 
to their inferior position within the asymmetric spatial distribution of political, economic and symbolic 
capabilities” (p.2). The analysis presented in this paper strongly suggests that TEP and DEV are 
important factors for energy peripheries in England.  
8.2. Bundles of multiple disadvantage 
There is increasing interest in understanding the ways in which different forms of poverty and 
disadvantage ‘bundle’ together, intensifying the negative impacts associated [89]. In the UK, this 
multiplicity of forms of disadvantage, and the importance of analysing the ways in which they overlap, 
is reflected in well-established deprivation metrics, including the Indices of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) 




that considers the accumulation of different domains of deprivation. However, this trend has rarely 
extended to energy poverty and transport poverty.  
An understanding of multiple forms of disadvantage highlights how certain vulnerability factors are 
likely to expose selected people or places to more than one type of stressor. Subsequently, the negative 
impacts associated are likely to accumulate in these households and places. This is often a cyclical and 
reinforcing process as vulnerability to one type of disadvantage may lead to an increasing likelihood of 
experiencing another. The concept of ‘energy periphery’ [88] emphasises this by pinpointing places 
where “energy-related factors are combined with other place-based conditions to subject their 
communities to a compound and circular effect of precarious energy experiences” (p.1).  
In the neighbourhoods identified as DEV, the negative impacts of each condition are likely to be 
intensified as households are required to cope with two forms of disadvantage in tangent. Households 
will experience trade-offs between whether to spend money on higher energy bills to sufficiently heat 
the home, or whether to fill the car with petrol, for example. This is similar to the well-known ‘heat-or-
eat’ phenomenon but has drawn less attention to date. Existing research (Section 2) suggests that in 
many cases these trade-offs will be resolved in favour of motor fuel, resulting in self-restriction 
behaviour within the home. Whilst recognising the diversity of experiences between households within 
areas that will not necessarily experience disadvantage in the same way, we would argue that this 
strengthens the case for energy poverty research to pay attention to TEP, and DEV.  
8.3. Policy implications 
8.3.1. Overcoming policy silos 
Building upon the need to recognise geographical accumulation of multiple forms of disadvantage in 
certain areas,  our analysis supports calls for an integrated approach to the governance of energy 
infrastructures,  that encourages policymakers to overcome sectoral divides, in favour of tackling issues 
that bridge multiple sectors [90]. For example, in the case of DEP the responsible government 
department in England is BEIS, concerned with energy and climate change. However, arguably several 
sectors are of relevance in tackling DEP including welfare, housing and transport. In recognition of this 
issue, the government recently created the Committee on Fuel Poverty (CFP), a non-departmental 
public body that encourages greater coordination across those organisations working to reduce DEP. 
The CFP recognises both the synergies and tensions between tackling DEP and reducing carbon 
emissions, a relationship that BEIS largely assumes is synergistic [91], however transport has not formed 
part of this agenda. Meanwhile, transport poverty (whether energy-related or not) is largely missing 
from the policy of the DfT in England [8, 92], although recent government commissioned reports show 
awareness of the concept [93, 94, 95]. 
Yet in other contexts, most notably France, the co-existence of DEP and TEP indicators within an 
overarching ‘energy poverty’ definition has gone some way towards stimulating knowledge production 
and policy making across sectoral boundaries.  Non-governmental organisations and research networks 
at the EU level have also advocated a better recognition of TEP as part of the energy poverty 
problem[96, 23; 24], and this is the object of ongoing research efforts in the UK [97]. 
8.3.2. Area-based targeting  
In evidencing the spatialities of DEV at a neighbourhood-scale, our research invites reflections on the 
effectiveness of area-based targeting for identifying and targeting households that are DEV. Area-based 
strategies are driven by an understanding that social problems tend to be spatially distributed in an 




uneven way, thus it is beneficial to target certain areas with a high concentration of people who are 
disadvantaged. A recent policy paper by the RTPI [98] argues that policies linked to the individual are 
insufficient and place-based approaches are key to tackling poverty, especially types of deprivation that 
are intrinsically linked to infrastructure. Area-based policies have been advocated for as a means of 
tackling DEP [30, 31]. These can arguably can be extended to TEP, building on the tradition of 
‘accessibility planning’ in the UK [99].  
Yet significant caveats have been identified regarding area-based targeting of DEP households. Fahmy 
et al. [27] suggest that the approach is highly sensitive to the way that different variables are measured, 
a conclusion that is reflected in our analysis by the differential geographies of vulnerability resulting 
from the selection of different indicators. There are also concerns that area-based targeting will be 
most effective in relatively socially homogenous areas that experience concentrated deprivation. For 
Walker et al. [6], area-based targeting is particularly effective in the case of NI where the problem is 
more endemic, with over half of households experiencing energy poverty using the 10% definition. 
However, even within areas identified as high risk not all homes will experience energy poverty [1]. 
Meanwhile, Burke and Jones [100] argue that rural areas tend to exhibit greater heterogeneity in 
deprivation within neighbourhoods, due to their size and configuration, reducing the relevance of 
nation-wide metrics. This has implications for our analysis in which DEV concentrates in rural areas 
which are likely to be heterogeneous, limiting the applicability of area-based targeting.  
8.3.3. Implications for carbon pricing and environmental policies 
Our findings have implications for current discussions on environmental taxation aimed at reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions. It is widely acknowledged that measures such as carbon pricing can have 
adverse distributional impacts, notably on households in DEP or TEP, unless revenue is appropriately 
redistributed [15]. Redistribution can be difficult however, DEP and TEP households are notoriously 
difficult to identify with any precision. Our analysis contributes to these discussions by highlighting that 
increases in fossil fuel prices would disproportionately affect a relatively small number of DEV rural 
areas in England, where the affordability of both domestic and transport energy services could be 
further compromised. At the root of this conundrum is the dependence on expensive fossil fuel-based 
heating systems and transport modes in some English rural areas.  
8.4. Limitations and directions for further research 
Our analysis is exploratory rather than explanatory, most suited to highlighting possible spatial trends 
in DEV. Whilst a neighbourhood may not have been identified as DEV during the analysis, considerable 
diversity amongst households within each LSOA is concealed by the area average. Existing research on 
DEV in the French context (Section 2) recognises how the socio-demographic profiles of households 
affected by DEP and TEP tend to be different. It is possible that this also applies to the areas that our 
analysis identified as double energy vulnerable.  
Additionally, the indicators upon which the analysis is based, in particular the DEP indicators, have been 
the focus of considerable critique centring upon the inability of a single indicator to measure what is a 
complex, and multi-faceted problem [65]. We have partly addressed this issue by using both the 10% 
and LIHC DEP indicators, which capture different (and complementary) notions of what it means to be 
fuel poor [19]. Likewise, the TEP metric adopted in this study focuses on a specific aspect, i.e. 
vulnerability to motor fuel price increases, and there may be other energy-relevant aspects of transport 
poverty that one may want to consider to get a more comprehensive view of TEP.  




Further household and individual scale analysis of the intricacies of what is means to experience DEV is 
required to underpin a formal measure of DEV. Although some social survey datasets include sufficient 
data to explore both DEP and TEP, either by design (e.g. the Phébus survey in France described by Berry 
et al. [101, 56]) or incidentally (e.g. the Scottish Household Survey), a formal DEV indicator also 
necessitates further in-depth qualitative understanding of the condition. Qualitative research would 
provide further insights into the negative impacts that DEV has on health and wellbeing, that are likely 
to be less acute when considering DEP or TEP in isolation.  It would also illustrate in greater detail how 
different demographics experience DEV, and whether households are likely to make different trade-
offs between energy in the domestic and transport spheres. Such understanding is integral to underpin 
a sub-regional indicator of DEV in the future. 
 
References  
[1] Boardman, B. (2013). Fixing fuel poverty: challenges and solutions. Routledge. 
[2] Dubois, U., & Meier, H. (2016). Energy affordability and energy inequality in Europe: Implications 
for policymaking. Energy Research & Social Science, 18, 21-35. 
[3] Middlemiss, L., & Gillard, R. (2015). Fuel poverty from the bottom-up: Characterising household 
energy vulnerability through the lived experience of the fuel poor. Energy Research & Social Science, 
6, 146-154. 
[4] Liddell, C., Morris, C., McKenzie, S. J. P., & Rae, G. (2012). Measuring and monitoring fuel poverty 
in the UK: National and regional perspectives. Energy policy, 49, 27-32. 
[5] Thomson, H., & Snell, C. (2013). Quantifying the prevalence of fuel poverty across the European 
Union. Energy Policy, 52, 563-572. 
[6] Walker, G., & Day, R. (2012). Fuel poverty as injustice: Integrating distribution, recognition and 
procedure in the struggle for affordable warmth. Energy policy, 49, 69-75. 
[7] Bouzarovski, S., & Petrova, S. (2015). A global perspective on domestic energy deprivation: 
Overcoming the energy poverty–fuel poverty binary. Energy Research & Social Science, 10, 31-40. 
[8] Mattioli, G., Lucas, K., & Marsden, G. (2017). Transport poverty and fuel poverty in the UK: From 
analogy to comparison. Transport Policy, 59, 93-105.  
[9] Simcock, N., & Mullen, C. (2016). Energy demand for everyday mobility and domestic life: 
Exploring the justice implications. Energy Research & Social Science, 18, 1-6. 
[10] Gough, I., Abdallah, S., Johnson, V., Ryan-Collins, J., & Smith, C. (2011). The distribution of total 
greenhouse gas emissions by households in the UK, and some implications for social policy. London: 
Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion. 
[11] Kauppila, J. (2011). Ten stylised facts about household spending on transport. ITF / OECD 
Statistical Paper No. 1/2011. 
[12] EEA (2019). Final energy consumption by sector and fuel. European Environment Agency 
[Retrieved from https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/final-energy-consumption-by-
sector-9/assessment-4, accessed on 17th November 2019] 




[13] Eurostat (2019). Household consumption by purpose [Retrieved from 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Household_consumption_by_purpose, 
accessed on 17th November 2019] 
[14] Snell, C., Lambie-Mumford, H., & Thomson, H. (2018). Is there evidence of households making a 
heat or eat trade off in the UK?. Journal of Poverty and Social Justice, 26(2), 225-243. 
[15] Berry, A. (2019). The distributional effects of a carbon tax and its impact on fuel poverty: A 
microsimulation study in the French context. Energy Policy, 124, 81-94. 
[16] Churchill, S. A., & Smyth, R. (2019). Transport poverty and subjective wellbeing. Transportation 
research part A: policy and practice, 124, 40-54. 
[17] Lucas, K., Mattioli, G., Verlinghieri, E., & Guzman, A. (2016). Transport poverty and its adverse 
social consequences. Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers-Transport, 169(6), 353-365.  
[18] Robinson, C., Bouzarovski, S., & Lindley, S. (2018a.). ‘Getting the measure of fuel poverty’: The 
geography of fuel poverty indicators in England. Energy Research & Social Science, 36, 79-93. 
[19] Robinson, C., Bouzarovski, S., & Lindley, S. (2018b.). Underrepresenting neighbourhood 
vulnerabilities? The measurement of fuel poverty in England. Environment and Planning A: Economy 
and Space, 50(5), 1109-1127. 
[20] Robinson, C. (2019a.). Energy poverty and gender in England: A spatial perspective. Geoforum. 
[21] Robinson, C., Lindley, S., & Bouzarovski, S. (2019b.). The Spatially Varying Components of 
Vulnerability to Energy Poverty. Annals of the American Association of Geographers, 1-20. 
[22] Mattioli, G., Philips, I., Anable, J., & Chatterton, T. (2019). Vulnerability to motor fuel price 
increases: socio-spatial patterns in England. Journal of Transport Geography, 78, 98-114.  
[23] Mattioli, G., & Martiskainen, M. (2019). Transport energy poverty: Prospects and pitfalls of 
expanding energy poverty beyond the household. In Sareen, S, & Thomson, H. (Eds.) (2019). Moving 
beyond the state of the art in energy poverty measurement, ENGAGER COST Working Group 2 
Report. http://www.engager-energy.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/WG2-report-November-2019-
1.pdf 
[24] OpenExp (2019). European Energy Poverty Index (EEPI). Assessing Member States’Progress in 
Alleviating the Domestic and Transport Energy Poverty Nexus.  
[25] Castán Broto, V. C., & Baker, L. (2018). Spatial adventures in energy studies: An introduction to 
the special issue. Energy research & social science, 36, 1-10. 
[26] Thomson, H., Bouzarovski, S., & Snell, C. (2017). Rethinking the measurement of energy poverty 
in Europe: A critical analysis of indicators and data. Indoor and Built Environment, 26(7), 879-901. 
[27] Fahmy, E., Gordon, D., & Patsios, D. (2011). Predicting fuel poverty at a small-area level in 
England. Energy Policy, 39(7), 4370-4377. 
[28] Cochez, N., Durieux, E., & Levy, D. (2015). Vulnérabilité énergétique. Loin des pôles urbains, 
chauffage et carburant pèsent fortement dans le budget. Insee Premiere, 1530. 
[29] Simoes, S. G., Gregório, V., & Seixas, J. (2016). Mapping fuel poverty in Portugal. Energy Procedia, 
106, 155-165. 




[30] Walker, R., McKenzie, P., Liddell, C., & Morris, C. (2012). Area-based targeting of fuel poverty in 
Northern Ireland: An evidenced-based approach. Applied Geography, 34, 639-649. 
[31] Reames, T. G. (2016). Targeting energy justice: Exploring spatial, racial/ethnic and socioeconomic 
disparities in urban residential heating energy efficiency. Energy Policy, 97, 549-558. 
[32] Reames, T. G., Reiner, M. A., & Stacey, M. B. (2018). An incandescent truth: Disparities in energy-
efficient lighting availability and prices in an urban US county. Applied energy, 218, 95-103. 
[33] Hall, S. M., Hards, S., & Bulkeley, H. (2013). New approaches to energy: equity, justice and 
vulnerability. Introduction to the special issue. 
[34] Currie, G. (Ed.). (2011). New perspectives and methods in transport and social exclusion research. 
Bingley: Emerald. 
[35] Hine, J., & Grieco, M. (2003). Scatters and clusters in time and space: implications for delivering 
integrated and inclusive transport. Transport Policy, 10, 299-306. 
[36] Lucas, K. (2012). Transport and social exclusion: Where are we now? Transport Policy, 20, 105-
113. 
[37] Velaga, N. R., Beecroft, M., Nelson, J. D., Corsar, D., & Edwards, P. (2012). Transport poverty 
meets the digital divide: accessibility and connectivity in rural communities. Journal of Transport 
Geography, 21, 102-112. 
[38] Mattioli G, & Colleoni M. (2016) Transport Disadvantage, Car Dependence and Urban Form. In: 
Colleoni, M., & Pucci, P. (Eds.). Understanding Mobilities for Designing Contemporary Cities. Springer.  
[39] Lucas, K., Phillips, I., Mulley, C., & Ma, L. (2018). Is transport poverty socially or environmentally 
driven? Comparing the travel behaviours of two low-income populations living in central and 
peripheral locations in the same city. Transportation Research Part A, 116, 622-634. 
[40] Berry, A., Jouffe, Y., Coulombel, N., & Guivarch, C. (2016). Investigating fuel poverty in the 
transport sector: toward a composite indicator of vulnerability. Energy Research & Social Science, 18, 
7-20. 
[41] Lovelace, R., & Philips, I. (2014). The ‘oil vulnerability’ of commuter patterns: A case study from 
Yorkshire and the Humber, UK. Geoforum, 51, 169-182. 
[42] Mattioli, G., Wadud, Z., & Lucas, K. (2018). Vulnerability to fuel price increases in the UK: A 
household level analysis. Transportation Research Part A, 113, 227-242. 
[43] Mayer, I., Nimal, E., Nogue, P., & Sevenet, M. (2014). The two faces of energy poverty: a case 
study of households’ energy burden in the residential and mobility sectors at the city level. 
Transportation Research Procedia, 4, 228-240. 
[44] Nicolas, J.P., Vanco, F., Verry, D. (2012). Mobilite' quotidienne et vulnerabilite' des menages. 
Revue d'Economie Regionale & Urbaine, 2012/1, 19-44. 
[45] Verry, D., Dy, K., & Nicolas, J.P. (2017). Vulnérabilité énergétique et mobilité quotidiennes: quelle 
mesure?. In: Dussud, F.-X., Lepoittevin, D., & Riedinger, N. (Eds.). Les ménages et la consummation 
d’énergie. Ministère de l’Environnement, de l’Énergie et de la Mer, en Charge des Relations 
Internationales sur le Climat.  




[46] Boardman, B. (1998). Rural transport policy. Discussion paper prepared for CPRE, the Countryside 
Commission and the Rural Development Commission.  
[47] Jouffe, Y., & Massot, M.H. (2013). Vulnérabilités sociales dans la transition énergétique au 
croisement de l'habitat et de la mobilité quotidienne. 1er Congrès Interdisciplinaire du Development 
Durable. Namur. 
[48] ONPE. (2014). Premier rapport de l'ONPE. Définitions, indicateurs, premiers résultats et 
recommendations. Observatoire National de la Precarité énergétique.  
[49] Saujot, M. (2012). La mobilité, l’autre vulnérabilité énergétique. IDDRI SciencesPo Policy Brief, 
5/2012, 1-6.   
[50] Büttner, B., Wulfhorst, G., Crozet, Y., & Mercier, A. (2013). The impact of sharp increases in 
mobility costs analysed by means of the Vulnerability Assessment. 13th World Conference on 
Transport Research, Rio de Janeiro, July 15-18, 2013. 
[51] Dodson, J., & Sipe, N. (2007). Oil vulnerability in the Australian city: Assessing socioeconomic risks 
from higher urban fuel prices. Urban Studies, 44(1), 37-62. 
[52] Leung, A., Burke, M., Cui, J. (2018). The tale of two (very different) cities – Mapping the urban 
transport oil vulnerability of Brisbane and Hong Kong. Transportation Research Part D, 65, 796-816. 
[53] Alterre Bourgogne (2007). Cartographies de la vulnérabilité énergétique des ménages 
bourguignons. [Retrieved from 
https://www.alterrebourgognefranchecomte.org/_depot_alterrebourgogne/_depot_arko/basesdoc/4
/2117/rt-cartographie-vulnerabilite-energetique.pdf , accessed on 21 November 2019] 
[54] Dijoux, A., & Rosales-Montano, S. (2009). La vulnerabilité énérgetique des ménages de l’aire 
metropolitaine élargie de Lyon. Premiere approche. Agence d’urbanisme pour le développement de 
l’agglomération lyonnaise.  
[55] IAU (2014). La vulnérabilité énergétique des ménages franciliens. Institut d'aménagement et 
d'urbanisme de la région de Île-de-France.  
[56] Verry, D., Dy, K., & Nicolas, J.P. (2017). Vulnérabilité énergétique et mobilité quotidiennes: quelle 
mesure?. In: Dussud, F.-X., Lepoittevin, D., & Riedinger, N. (Eds.). Les ménages et la consummation 
d’énergie. Ministère de l’Environnement, de l’Énergie et de la Mer, en Charge des Relations 
Internationales sur le Climat.  
[57] ONPE. (2014). Premier rapport de l'ONPE. Définitions, indicateurs, premiers résultats et 
recommendations. Observatoire National de la Precarité énergétique.  
[58] Desjardins, X., & Mettetal, L. (2012). L'habiter périurbain face à l'enjeu énergetique. Flux, 89/90, 
46-57. 
[59] Ortar, N. (2018). Dealing with energy crises: Working and living arrangements in peri-urban 
France. Transport Policy, 65, 72-78. 
[60] Defra (Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs) (2013) Rural-Urban Classification 
(2011) of Lower Layer Super Output Areas in England and Wales. [online] Available at: < 
https://data.gov.uk/dataset/b1165cea-2655-4cf7-bf22-dfbd3cdeb242/rural-urban-classification-
2011-of-lower-layer-super-output-areas-in-england-and-wales> [Accessed 20th January 2020]  




[61] ONS (Office for National Statistics) (2011) Census Boundary Data [online] https:// 
census.ukdataservice.ac.uk/use-data/guides/boundary-data (Accessed 31 March 2017). 
[62] DECC (Department for Energy and Climate Change) (2014) Fuel Poverty Sub-regional Statistics: 
2012. [online] https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/fuel-povertysub-regional-statistics 
(Accessed 29 November 2016). 
[63] Hills, J. (2012). Getting the measure of fuel poverty: Final Report of the Fuel Poverty Review. 
[64] Moore, R. (2012). Definitions of fuel poverty: Implications for policy. Energy Policy, 49, 19-26. 
[65] Middlemiss, L. (2017). A critical analysis of the new politics of fuel poverty in England. Critical 
Social Policy, 37(3), 425-443. 
[66] Adger, W. N. (2006) Vulnerability. Global Environmental Change. 16(3), p. 268-281. 
[67] Brooks, N. (2003) Vulnerability, risk and adaptation: A conceptual framework. Tyndall Centre for 
Climate Change Research Working Paper, 38, p. 1-16. 
[68] Cairns, S., Anable, J., Chatterton, T., Wilson, E., & Morton, C. (2017). MOToring Along: The lives of 
cars seen through licensing and test data. London: RAC Foundation. 
[69] Chatterton, T., Anable, J., Barnes, J. &Yeboah, G. (2016) Mapping household direct energy 
consumption in the United Kingdom to provide a new perspective on energy justice. Energy Research 
& Social Science. 18, p. 71-87.  
[70] Chatterton, T. (2017). Developing an index of vulnerability to motor fuel price increases in 
England. Universities Transport Study Group Annual Conference 2017. 
[71] Chatterton, T., Barnes, J., Wilson, E., Anable, J & Cairns, S. (2015) Use of a novel dataset to 
explore and social variations in car type, usage and emissions, Transportation Research Part D, 39, p. 
151-164. 
[72] Experian Limited. (2007). Experian Demographic Data, 2004-2005 and 2008-2011. [data 
collection]. UK Data Service. SN: 5738, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-5738-1 
[73] DfT (Department for Transport) (2012). Accessibility Statistics 2011. Department for Transport 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file
/9083/accessibility-statistics-2011.pdf > [Accessed 23 November 2019] 
[74] Chatterton, T., Anable, J., Cairns, S., & Wilson, E. (2018). Financial implications of car ownership 
and use: a social and spatial distributional analysis. Transport Policy, 65, 30-39.  
[75] Bibby, P., & Brindley, P. (2013). Urban and Rural Area Definitions for Policy Purposes in England 
and Wales: Methodology (v1.0). Office for National Statistics, Department for Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs, Department for Communities and Local Government, Welsh Government. 
[76] Anselin, L. (1995). Local indicators of spatial association—LISA. Geographical analysis, 27(2), 93-
115. 
[77] Waller, L. A., & Gotway, C. A. (2004). Applied spatial statistics for public health data (Vol. 368). 
John Wiley & Sons. 
[78] Rae, A. (2012). Spatially concentrated deprivation in England: An empirical assessment. Regional 
Studies, 46(9), 1183-1199. 




[79] Furlong, J. (2019). The changing electoral geography of England and Wales: Varieties of “left-
behindedness”. Political Geography, 102061. 
[80] Harrison, C., & Popke, J. (2011). “Because you got to have heat”: the networked assemblage of 
energy poverty in eastern North Carolina. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 101(4), 
949-961. 
[81] Graham, S., & Marvin, S. (1994). Cherry picking and social dumping: utilities in the 1990s. Utilities 
policy, 4(2), 113-119. 
[82] Roberts, D., Vera-Toscano, E., & Phimister, E. (2015). Fuel poverty in the UK: Is there a difference 
between rural and urban areas?. Energy policy, 87, 216-223. 
[83] English Housing Survey (EHS) (2014) English Housing Survey, Energy Report, 2014. < 
https://bit.ly/2tA2VZ8> 
[84] Gray, D., Farrington, J., Shaw, J., Martin, S., & Roberts, D. (2001). Car dependence in rural 
Scotland: transport policy, devolution and the impact of the fuel duty escalator. Journal of Rural 
Studies, 17(1), 113-125. 
[85] Crisp, R., Ferrari, E., Gore, T. Green, S., McCarthy, L., Rae, A., Reeve, K. & Stevens, M. (2018). 
Tackling transport-related barriers to employment in low-income neighbourhoods, Report for Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation. https://www.jrf.org.uk/report/tackling-transport-related-barriers-
employment-low-income-neighbourhoods 
[86] Mees, P. (2010). Transport for suburbia: beyond the automobile age. Earthscan. 
[87] Campaign for Better Transport (2018) Buses in Crisis. A report on bus funding across England and 
Wales 2010 – 2018. https://bettertransport.org.uk/sites/default/files/research-files/Buses-in-Crisis-
2018_0.pdf 
[88] Golubchikov, O., & O'Sullivan, K. (2020). Energy periphery: Uneven development and the 
precarious geographies of low-carbon transition. Energy and Buildings, 211, 109818. 
[89] Midgley, J., Hodge, I., & Monk, S. (2003). Patterns and concentrations of disadvantage in England: 
A rural-urban perspective. Urban Studies, 40(8), 1427-1454. 
[90] Florini, A., & Sovacool, B. K. (2011). Bridging the gaps in global energy governance. Global 
Governance, 57-74. 
[91] CSE (Centre for Sustainable Energy) (2018) Tackling fuel poverty, reducing carbon emissions and 
keeping household bills down: tensions and synergies. CSE, Bristol. 
[92] Sustrans (2012). Environment Audit Committee: Written evidence submitted by Sustrans. 
<https://bit.ly/3aur1oz>  
[93] Gates, S., Gogescu, F., Grollman, C., Cooper, E., & Khambhaita, P. (2019). Transport and 
inequality: An evidence review for the Department for Transport, NatCen Social Research 
(https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
843487/Transport_and_inequality_report.pdf) 
[94] Government Office for Science (2019). A time of unprecedented change in the transport System 
(https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
780868/future_of_mobility_final.pdf) 




[95] Lucas, K., Stokes, G., Bastiaanssen, J., & Burkinshaw, J. (2019). Inequalities in Mobility and Access 
in the UK Transport System, Future of Mobility: Evidence Review, Foresight, Government Office for 
Science (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/future-of-mobility-inequalities-in-mobility-
and-access-in-the-uk) 
[96] Dubois, U., Assimakopoulos, M., Biermann, P., Gouveia, J.P., Karlessi, T., Kyprianou, I., Mattioli, G., 
Murauskaite, L., & Sinea, A. (2018). 1. Towards harmonized regional energy poverty assessments. In: 
Bouzarovski, S. (Ed.) ENGAGER COST Policy Brief no. 1, University of Manchester. 
https://bit.ly/2LuSzQS   
[97] Simcock, N., Jenkins, K., Mattioli, G., Lacey-Barnacle, M., Bouzarovski, S., & Martiskainen, M. 
(2020). Vulnerability to fuel and transport poverty. Centre for Research into Energy Demand Solutions 
(CREDS) Policy Brief 010. 
[98] Royal Town Planning Institute (RTPI) (2016) Poverty, place and inequality. Research Report,  Royal 
Town Planning Institute.  
[99] Lucas, K. (2006). Providing transport for social inclusion within a framework for environmental 
justice in the UK. Transportation Research Part A, 40(10), 801-809. 
[100] Burke, A., & Jones, A. (2019). The development of an index of rural deprivation: A case study of 
Norfolk, England. Social Science & Medicine, 227, 93-103. 
[101] Berry, A. (2018). Measuring energy poverty: uncovering the multiple dimensions of energy 
poverty. CIRED Working Papers, 2018-69. 
 
 
